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1.  Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the significant factors that affect 
the long-term debt decision of U.S. casino firms.  Long-term debt is a 
major component of many casino companies’ capital structure.  For 
example, as of the end of the third quarter in 2009, MGM Mirage had 
$12.9 billion in long-term debt (approximately 74 percent of total debt) 
while Las Vegas Sands had $11.6 billion in long-term debt (approximately 
84 percent of total debt) (CNBC, 2009).  Thus, since long-term debt plays 
a critical role in casino financing, a study of how casino firms make their 
long-term debt decisions should be warranted. 
Although a large body of work has been compiled about capital 
structure, very little work involving the hospitality industry has been 
completed and even less has been done with the casino industry 
specifically.   Some preliminary capital structure work was completed by 
Kwansa, Johnson and Olsen (1987) for the hotel industry.   Additionally, 
some comparative studies have been completed with the hotel industry 
and other types of industries (Gu, 1995/96; Sheel, 1994).  Another study 
by Kim (1997) examined potential determinants for restaurant firms.  
Nevertheless, further investigation into this topic, particularly for the casino 
industry, appears to be warranted. 
One of the major features of the empirical financial literature is an 
attempt to find a unifying theory of capital structure.  However, as 
discussed by Myers (2001), despite some forty years of research, it is 
unreasonable to expect to find a “universal” capital structure theory soon, 
if ever.   More importantly, however, is the notion that although the existing 
theories regarding capital structure cannot really be generalized, most 
studies empirically test them across a large, heterogeneous sample.  As 
discussed by Myers (2001), testing in this manner can be uninformative, if 
not misleading.  As Myers points out, some research will show support for 
two conflicting theories because each may be consistent with a particular 
subsample of a large cross sectional database. 
Capital structure can differ greatly even within apparently 
homogenous industries.   MacKay and Phillips (2005) find that leverage 
varies more within an industry than between industries.  Additionally, 
much of the variation is firm specific.  Another example applies to the 
seemingly homogenous hospitality industry.  Dalbor and Upneja (2002) 
find a significant and negative relationship between long-term debt and 
growth opportunities for restaurant firms, which is consistent with findings 
by Barclay and Smith (1995).  On the other hand, Upneja and Dalbor 
(2004) find a significantly positive relationship between long-term debt and 
growth opportunities for U.S. lodging firms.  Although this relationship was 
not expected a priori, there is some support for the direction and 
significance of this relationship (Wald, 1999; Mooradian & Yang, 2001; 
Tang & Jang, 2007).   
Given the lack of capital structure research in the casino industry 
specifically and the emerging trend in the literature towards industry 
capital structure specificity, we continue our examination of the existing 
literature regarding the three major theories of capital structure as outlined 
by Myers (2001):  Tradeoff theory, pecking order and free cash flow 
theory.  This paper is organized as follows.  Section two will review the 
relevant literature.  Section three will present the hypotheses to be tested.  
Section four will present our model and a discussion of our data sample.  
Section five will present our results and section six will follow with a 
discussion of the results and potential topics for further research.          
  
2.  Review of Literature  
 
According to Myers (2001), capital structure theories can be divided into 
three major areas:  (1) the tradeoff theory; (2) the pecking order theory; 
and (3) the free cash flow theory.  The tradeoff theory states that interest 
tax shields have value to the firm and will be used up to the point where 
the marginal tax benefits of debt equal the costs of potential financial 
distress.  The pecking-order and free cash flow theories both involve the 
management and minimization of agency costs between shareholders and 
lenders and shareholders and managers.  The literature has recently 
seemed to lend greater support to the latter two theories as opposed to 
the tradeoff theory. 
Although the tradeoff theory was the first major attempt to explain 
capital structure, it may only explain a portion of the capital structure 
decision.  For example, under the tradeoff theory, profitable firms would 
always take advantage of interest tax shields.  However, as discussed by 
Myers (2001), there are many successful and profitable firms that have 
little or no debt in their capital structures (Microsoft and Starbucks are just 
two well-known examples).  Additionally, Fama and French (1998) find no 
evidence that interest tax shields contribute to the value of the firm.   
Nevertheless, although it appears that the tradeoff theory of tax 
benefits versus potential distress costs may not provide a comprehensive 
explanation of debt choice, it does play some role in the amount of debt 
issued.  As an example, nondebt tax shields such as depreciation can 
serve as a substitute for tax savings from interest.   Firms may not want to 
incur higher agency costs of debt because they can take advantage of 
other types of tax shields (DeAngelo & Marsulis, 1980; de Miguel and 
Pindado, 2001).  Depreciation expense is one of these tax shields and is 
often expressed as a percentage of assets (Titman & Wessls, 1988; 
Chang, 2009).  European firms with a significant amount of depreciation 
were found to use less long-term debt by Wald (1999).  These findings are 
consistent with earlier research conducted by DeAngelo and Marsulis 
(1980) and Mackie-Mason (1990). 
However, the relationship between long-term debt and depreciation 
could be indeterminate.  As previously discussed, DeAngelo and Marsulis 
(1980) show firms with nondebt tax shields use less debt.  On the other 
hand, there is an argument proffered by Wald (1999) that firms with 
greater physical assets will show creditors that the firm is putting these 
assets to use and thus, there could be a positive relationship between 
long-term debt and depreciation (although land does not depreciate).  
Thus, while Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) find a positive relationship 
between depreciation and debt, Mackie-Mason (1990) finds a negative 
one. 
When examining the lodging industry specifically, there is also some 
contradictory evidence in regards to the relationship between depreciation 
expense and the use of long-term debt.  Upneja and Dalbor (2001) use a 
sample of lodging firms (SIC 7011) for the years 1974 through 1997 and 
find a significantly negative relationship between depreciation expense 
(divided by total assets) and long-term debt.  Dalbor and Upneja (2004) 
use a lodging sample for the years 1981 and 2000 and find a negative but 
insignificant relationship between the depreciation ratio to assets and 
long-term debt.  This contradiction may be due to time sensitivity or else 
depreciation expense is related to investments in fixed assets which may 
be more of a proxy for growth opportunities in the lodging industry.    
The pecking-order theory as put forth by Myers (2001) describes the 
preference of firms to minimize the various agency costs of debt and 
equity by first using retained earnings, then debt and finally, outside 
equity.  Accordingly, as postulated by the pecking-order theory, risky firms 
(with fewer retained earnings) will use more debt.  This may be from the 
fact that retained earnings are simply not available for use, and that the 
agency costs of new external equity are too high.  Debt subsequently 
becomes the default financing choice.  These costs may be too high as 
there may be an information asymmetry problem whereby shareholders 
worry that there is the potential for underinvestment—the failure to take 
advantage of positive net present value projects.  This positive relationship 
between risk and debt is supported by the research of MacKay and 
Phillips (2005) and de Miguel and Pindado (2001). 
The pecking-order theory and free cash flow theories can become 
enmeshed.  The two theories both help explain the use of debt for firms 
with growth opportunities.  Growth opportunities are generally expressed 
by comparing market values to book values in one form or another.  Both 
of the theories hypothesize that the choice of financing is used to minimize 
the agency costs and are dependent upon the type of asset investment.  
Given that the market value of the firm is expressed as the book value and 
assets in place (tangible) and the market value of its growth opportunities 
(intangible assets), these intangible assets can play a significant role in 
the choice of financing. 
If a firm has a significant amount of growth opportunities, there may 
be an information asymmetry problem for lenders.  Accordingly, the 
agency costs of debt can become excessive.  As discussed by Myers 
(2001), debt can serve to “put firms on a diet” by forcing firms to pay out 
cash in the form of interest and principal payments.  Therefore, firms with 
growth opportunities will not want to incur the extra agency costs and will 
typically utilize less debt in their capital structures.  Lenders may also be 
less confident about the true value of such intangible assets.  The 
negative relationship between growth opportunities and debt was found by 
Kim (1997) and Barclay and Smith (1995; 1999). 
On the other hand, Wald (1999) obtains mixed results for his sample.  
He finds a negative relationship between growth opportunities and debt for 
U.S. firms.  On the other hand, he finds a positive relationship between 
debt and growth opportunities for Japanese, British, German and French 
firms.  Interestingly enough, the Japanese sample contains high growth 
companies in construction and real estate development.  Both of these 
types of firms are arguably similar to hotel companies.  Additionally, Myers 
(2001) discusses survey research that finds high debt use by real estate 
development industries.   
Some research has already been completed that investigates the 
relationship between debt and growth opportunities for the hotel industry.  
Mooradian and Yang (2001) find a highly significant relationship between 
leverage and market-to-book value ratios for REIT and non-REIT hotel 
companies.  Moreover, Dalbor and Upneja (2004) find a significantly 
positive relationship between long-term debt and growth opportunities for 
U.S. lodging firms.   This finding was confirmed by research conducted by 
Tang and Jang (2007).     
Given the literature reviewed and discussed herein, it appears that 
growth opportunities are not homogeneous and may vary across 
industries.  As previously mentioned, growth opportunities are typically 
measured as the excess of market value above book value (Barclay and 
Smith, 1999).  Firms heavily involved in real estate development such as 
hotels and casinos may have their growth opportunities more closely tied 
to future investment in fixed, tangible assets (as opposed to intellectual 
assets such as patents on pharmaceuticals).   Accordingly, this may give 
lenders a greater level of comfort in terms of the ability to assess the true 
value of these growth opportunities, which could lower the agency cost of 
debt.  This may explain the positive relationship between leverage and 
growth opportunities finding in hotel REITS and non-REIT hotels by 
Mooradian and Yang (2001).  Given that casino development often 
involves hotel construction, we may expect that casino firms with greater 
growth opportunities will use more long-term debt. 
Based on the foregoing reasoning, fixed assets (such as property, 
plant and equipment or PPE) should also be positively associated with 
long-term debt.  It may be such that lenders are more able to assess asset 
values that are more readily observable and their values more easily 
recoverable in a bankruptcy proceeding.  As discussed by Vilasuso and 
Minkler (2001), the capital structure of firms is also dependent upon asset 
specificity and that firms will increasingly rely on equity financing as assets 
become more difficult to the redeploy.  A review of capital structure 
literature by Marsh (1982) finds that firms with more fixed assets use more 
long-term debt.  Furthermore, a positive relationship between PPE and 
debt is found by Wald (1999), de Miguel and Pindado (2001) and 
Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001).     
Investments in PPE can help a firm grow, but this growth could lead 
to “empire building”.  The literature survey by Marsh (1982) finds a positive 
relationship between long-term debt and firm size.  This directional 
relationship is hypothesized in Jensen’s free cash flow theory (1986).  As 
firms grow, managers have more power as the number of assets under 
their control increases.  Accordingly, there may be “free cash flow”—cash 
flows in excess of what is required to invest in positive net present value 
projects.  Therefore, interest and principal payments can help alleviate this 
overinvestment problem for the firm.  A number of papers have found a 
positive relationship between firm size and the use of debt including 
Chang (2009), Mackay and Phillips (2005), and Wald (1999).  We would 
anticipate a similar finding for casino firms. 
 
3.  Hypotheses to be tested 
 
Given the theories from the literature previously discussed, we have 
selected five research hypotheses related to the long-term debt of U.S. 
casino firms:   
 H1:  Casino firms with more nondebt tax shields (as measured by the ratio 
of depreciation expense to total assets) will use less long-term debt. 
H2:  Long-term debt is positively related to casino firm risk. 
H3:  Casino firms with more fixed assets (property, plant and equipment) 
will use more long-term debt. 
H4:  Long-term debt is positively related to casino firm size. 
H5:  Casino firms with more growth opportunities will use more long-term 
debt. 
Based on the foregoing, we have selected a dataset from which to 
draw our observations and an appropriate methodology to test the 
hypotheses.  The variables used and the data are discussed in the 
following section. 
 
4.  Data and methodology 
 
The total sample for this study is all U.S. casino firms taken from the 
COMPUSTAT database for the years 1987 through 2008.  A list of all 
casino firms used in shown in Table 1.   
**insert table 1 here** 
This list can be further divided into two subsamples by the North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS):  Code Number 713210 
(Casinos excluding hotels) and Code Number 72110 (Casino hotels).  It 
should be noted that not all firms are available for each year used 
because of bankruptcies, mergers, companies going private or de-listings.  
The maximum potential number of observations for the sample was 699.   
However, due to circumstances previously described, the number of 
observations used in the various regression models was less.  Summary 
statistics for the entire sample are shown in Table 2.   
**insert table 2 here** 
As shown in the summary statistics, the average long-term debt to 
asset ratio is approximately 31 percent.  The PPE ratio shows a mean 
value of 63 percent, indicating the fixed-asset intensity of the industry as a 
whole.  The earnings to price ratio has a negative mean value, indicating 
many firms have net losses in some years.  The average market value of 
equity to book value of equity is also negative; while the market value of 
equity is censored at 0, some firms have negative equity on their balance 
sheets. 
The regression models used herein are based upon the three major 
capital structure theories identified by Myers (2001):  tradeoff, pecking 
order and free cash flow.  The static tradeoff model theorizes that firms 
with more nondebt tax shields (such as depreciation) will borrow less as 
these serve as a substitute for the interest tax shields.   
The pecking order model theorizes that firms have a preference for 
financing with retained earnings.  However, risky firms tend to not perform 
as well and have less retained earnings available for use.  Therefore, we 
hypothesize that risky firms will use more debt.  Furthermore, the pecking 
order theory hypothesizes that firms with greater growth opportunities will 
not want to be constrained by debt covenants and borrow less.  However, 
research previously discussed has found the opposite and we believe this 
is true for casino firms.   
Finally, the free cash flow theory involves the use of debt to motivate 
firm managers to manage investments properly.  Debt service payments 
can also act as a monitoring agent on firm managers.  Moreover, it may be 
that larger firms are more able to afford the large fixed costs associated 
with issuing long-term debt.  Accordingly, we hypothesize larger firms and 
those with more property, plant and equipment will use more long-term 
debt.    
A summary of the variables and their associated calculations are 
shown in Table 2.  The full regression model used to test the hypotheses 
is shown below: 
 
LTDR = α0 + αDEP + α2EOO + α3PPE + α4SIZE + α5GO + εi 
LTDR = The ratio of debt maturing in more than three years to total 
assets. 
DEP = The ratio of depreciation expense to total assets. 
EOO = Firm risk as measured by the firm’s estimated Ohlson’s O score.  
The calculation of the variable is explained in the Appendix. 
 
PPE = The ratio of property, plant and equipment (net) to total assets. 
SIZE = Firm size as measured by the natural log of total assets. 
 
GO = A growth opportunity variable measured five different ways: 
• MVA/BVA is the ratio of the market value of assets to book value of 
assets.  Market value of assets is calculated by taking the market 
value of equity and adding total assets. 
• E/P is the ratio of earnings per share to annual closing price per 
share. 
• MVE/BVE is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of 
equity. 
• CAP EXP/SALES is the ratio of capital expenditures to total sales. 
• CAP EXP/ASSETS is the ratio of capital expenditures to total 
assets. 
 
εi = the error term in the regression. 
 
We utilize a pooled cross-section regression model that examines the 
variables of interest across firms and over time.  This is consistent with 
many papers in the financial literature including those already discussed in 
the literature review. 
 
5.  Results 
 
The regression results for the entire sample are shown in Table 3.  This 
sample, as previously discussed, contains casino firms and casino hotel 
firms.  Variance inflation factors were calculated for all regressions and 
there were no factors about 1.4, indicating a lack of multicollinearity. 
However, because we are using a sample of firms that continues 
from year to year, the possibility of serial correlation exists.  As stated by 
Myers (2001), debt ratios are “lumpy” in that they often remain similar from 
year to year.  Therefore, we added a lagged long-term debt ratio as an 
independent variable and ran the autoreg procedure in SAS.  When using 
a lagged dependent variable as an independent variable, the normal 
Durbin-Watson statistic is no longer valid.  We ran Durbin’s h and t tests in 
SAS which indicated no serial correlation after adding the lagged debt 
ratio. 
**insert table 3 here** 
All models contain variables for depreciation, risk, PPE, size, lagged 
debt ratio and a growth opportunity variable.  The first model shows a 
significant and positive relationship between long-term debt and risk.  
There is also a significantly positive relationship between firm size and 
long-term debt.  The first model includes the ratio of market value of 
assets to book value of assets as a growth opportunity variable, but it is 
not significant. 
The second regression model is very much the same as the first 
model, except that the growth opportunity variable in the second model is 
the ratio of earnings per share to price per share.  The higher the ratio, the 
fewer growth opportunities are expected by the market for that particular 
firm.  We find a highly significant and positive relationship with long-term 
debt, indicating that casino firms with fewer growth opportunities use more 
long-term debt.  This finding also means that firms with greater growth 
opportunities use less long-term debt.  This is consistent with general 
financial literature, but is contrary to some findings in the lodging industry 
(Tang & Jang, 2007; Dalbor & Upneja, 2004).   
The third regression model results are similar to the first two in terms 
of size and risk.  This model utilizes the ratio of market value of equity to 
book value of equity as the growth opportunity variable, although it is 
insignificant.  The fourth model utilizes the ratio of capital expenditures to 
sales as a growth opportunity variable, but it too is insignificant.   
Finally, the fifth regression model utilizes the ratio of capital 
expenditures to total assets to represent growth opportunities.  The 
relationship with long-term debt is highly significant and positive, which is 
different from what we find in model two.  However, it should be 
considered that not all growth opportunities can be considered equal.  
Some firms (pharmaceutical firms, for example) may exploit growth 
opportunities through the buildup of intangible assets.  The casino 
industry, much like the lodging industry, is quite fixed asset intensive.  The 
growth opportunities in the casino business may be exploited through 
expenditures on long-term assets.  The use of long-term debt to finance 
fixed assets is consistent with the literature explored by Walsh (1982). 
The results for the entire sample fail to support the first hypothesis.  
The results also fail to support hypothesis three.  Hypothesis two (firm 
risk) and hypothesis four (firm size) are supported by the results.  In terms 
of growth opportunities, the results are indeterminate because of the signs 
of the E/P coefficient and the CAP EXP/ASSETS coefficients are both 
positive.  
**insert table 4 here** 
Table 4 shows results for Casinos (excluding hotels).  The results are 
very similar to those in Table 3.  The risk and size coefficients are positive 
and highly significant in all models.  The E/P coefficient is positive as in 
the full sample, but only marginally significant for casinos.  The MVE/BVE 
coefficient is insignificant.  The main difference between the results in 
Tables 3 and 4 is that CAP EXP/ASSETS coefficient is not significant for 
casinos.  Once again, some of the growth opportunity variables provide a 
conflicting story regarding growth opportunities and the use of long-term 
debt. 
In terms of support of our research hypotheses, the results for the 
casino firms once again fail to support the first hypothesis.  The results 
also fail to support hypothesis three.  Hypothesis two (firm risk) and 
hypothesis four (firm size) are supported by the results.  In terms of growth 
opportunities, our expectation of hypothesis five is marginally rejected 
because of the positive coefficient on the E/P variable.    
**insert Table 5 here** 
Table 5 displays the regression results for casino hotels.  Once 
again, the risk and firm size coefficients are all positive and highly 
significant in all models.  The results in this table are different from Tables 
3 and 4 in terms of the depreciation coefficient.  The first four models 
show negative and significant coefficients for the depreciation variable.  
The depreciation coefficient is negative and marginally significant in the 
last model.  This finding appears to lend some support to the tradeoff 
theory in that casino hotels with more depreciation tend to use less long-
term debt. 
In terms of growth opportunities, casino hotels also display a 
contradictory story.  The E/P coefficient is positive and highly significant, 
indicating firms with fewer growth opportunities use more long-term debt.  
On the other hand, the CAP EXP/ASSETS coefficient is positive and 
highly significant, indicating growth opportunities being positively 
associated with long-term debt. 
In terms of support of our research hypotheses, the results for the 
casino hotel sample tend to support the tradeoff theory of the first 
hypothesis.  The results once again fail to support hypothesis three.  
Hypothesis two (firm risk) and hypothesis four (firm size) are once again 
supported by the results.  Similar to the results for the entire sample, the 
confirmation of hypothesis five is undetermined because the signs of the 
E/P coefficient and the CAP EXP/ASSETS are both positive. 
 
5.  Conclusions and Implications 
 
The purpose of this research is to test the use of long-term debt by casino 
firms under the three major theories of capital structure.  We examine 
long-term debt use for all casino firms and subsequently divide the sample 
into two subsamples, casino firms and casino hotel firms.  The results are 
nearly identical for the sample as a whole and casino firms.  The 
regression results show a positive relationship between risk and long-term 
debt (supporting the pecking order theory) as well as a positive 
relationship between firm size and long-term debt (supporting the free 
cash flow theory).  However, we did not find significant relationships 
between depreciation expense and long-term debt and PPE investment 
and long-term debt for both the entire sample and the casino firms 
subsample.  We are not surprised by the results for the depreciation 
expense coefficient as the tradeoff theory seems to be losing credibility 
among researchers as time goes on (Shyam-Sunder & Myers, 1999).  We 
are surprised, however, by the lack of significance of the PPE coefficients 
in all the regression models. 
We also ran regressions for a casino hotel subsample.  The results 
were also very similar to the first two series of regressions.  Both firm risk 
and firm size are positively related to long-term debt.  One major 
difference was the significantly negative relationship between depreciation 
expense and long-term debt in the first four models, thus lending some 
credence to the trade-off theory of capital structure. 
The common feature among all three sets of regression results is 
somewhat puzzling.  In all three sets of regressions (with varying degrees 
of significance) there is a positive relationship between the earnings/price 
ratio and long-term debt.  This indicates firms with fewer growth 
opportunities use more long-term debt.  Conversely, two sets of 
regressions show a positive and highly significant relationship between the 
CAP EX/ASSETS ratio and long-term debt.  Thus, this result indicates a 
positive relationship between long-term debt and future growth.  
The conflicting results can be seen as one motivation for doing this 
paper.  The growth opportunity explanation within the pecking order theory 
of capital structure appears to be unclear.  Perhaps this is to be expected 
because as discussed by Myers (2001), capital structure theories are not 
really meant to be generalized across industries.  Even within the 
hospitality industry there are differences.  For example, Dalbor and Upneja 
(2002) find a negative relationship between a growth opportunities long-
term debt for the restaurant industry while Tang and Jang (2007) find a 
positive relationship between growth opportunities and long-term debt for 
the lodging industry. 
The use of the earnings to price ratio may also be an imperfect 
measure of growth opportunities.  Firm earnings are accrual-based an 
affected by special charges, one-time gains and losses and changes in 
depreciation methods.  They have also been the focus in recent years 
regarding manipulation (Enron, for example).  Additionally, the earnings 
used in E/P ratios in the financial literature are historical while market 
prices typically reflect future prospects for earnings and/or cash flows. 
There may be other factors involved in the relationship between the 
use of debt and growth opportunities.  First, we have only examined the 
use of long-term debt.  The fact that construction lending is short-term (the 
use of “bridge loans”, for example) may not be adequately addressed in 
the current research design.  Furthermore, much like many other 
businesses, the casino business is cyclical and subject to economic 
fluctuations.  For example, gaming revenue for metropolitan Las Vegas 
declined more than 23 percent from 2007 to 2009 (The Center for 
Economic and Business Research, 2010).  This could impact a firm’s 
ability and willingness to borrow funds.  This can also vary from firm to firm 
and potentially confound results. 
There are a number of potential issues to be explored here.  One 
involves differences between hospitality industry sub-segments that could 
be worth investigating.  There could also be discrepancies involving the 
time period of data being used.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, is 
the appropriate measure of growth opportunities.  There is yet no 
consensus on which measure is best.  Although research and 
development expenditures are often used as a proxy for firm growth in the 
mainstream financial literature, these types of expenditures are typically 
small or non-existent for many hospitality firms.  Thus, capital 
expenditures are often used in place of research and development figures 
in hospitality research. 
Since most hospitality firms are fixed asset intensive, further 
investigation into the true benefit of capital expenditures is warranted.  In 
other words, do hospitality firms that spend on capital improvements really 
grow future earnings?  If so, how much growth is there?  These are just 
two questions that could be answered by future hospitality researchers. 
   
Appendix 
 
The Original O-score (probability) of bankruptcy is calculated in the 
following manner:  First, we calculate the numerical value (NV) of the 
probability of bankruptcy.  The second step is to calculate the O-score that 
represents the probability of bankruptcy. 
NV = -1.249 - 0.211*SIZE +2.262*TLTA – 3.451*WCTA + 0.293*CLCA – 
0.907*OENEG –1.08*NITA – 0.838*FUTL + 1.266*INTWO -0.96*CHIN 
The O-Score ranges from 0 (extremely low probability of 
bankruptcy) to 1 (indicating a 100% probability of bankruptcy).  The 
procedure for calculating the Revised O-score is based on the equation 
below. 
O-Score = 1/(1 + e-NV) 
An explanation of the variables is shown below. 
Variable Calculation 
SIZE Log of total assets 
TLTA Total Liabilities/Total Assets 
WCTA Working Capital/Total Assets 
CLCA Current Liabilities/Current Assets 
OENEG If total liabilities > total assets,  OENEG = 1 
If total liabilities ≤ total assets, OENEG = 0  
NITA Net income or loss/Total Assets 
FOTL Funds received from operations/total liabilities 
INTWO If the firm has reported a net loss for the current 
period AND the previous period INTWO =1; O 
otherwise 
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Table 1. 
List of casino firms in complete sample. 
 
Ameristar Casinos Holly Holdings Incorporated 
Anchor Gaming Hollywood Casino Corporation 
Archon Corporation International Thoroughbred 
Breeders 
Argosy Gaming Company Isle of Capri Casinos 
Aztar Corporation JCC Holding Company 
Ballys’ Grand Incorporated Kerzner International Limited 
Black Hawk Gaming and 
Development 
Lady Luck Gaming Corporation 
Boardwalk Casino Lakes Entertainment Incorporated 
Boomtown Incorporated Las Vegas Sands Corporation 
Bouncebacktechnologies.com Lottery and Waging Solutions 
Boyd Gaming Mandalay Resort Group 
Caesars Entertainment Melco Crown Entertainment 
Caesars New Jersey MGM Mirage 
Caesars World Mirage Resorts Incorporated 
Capital Gaming International Monarch Casino and Resort 
Casino Magic Corporation Nevada Gold and Casinos 
Century Casinos Oasis Resorts International 
Colorado Casino Resorts Pinnacle Entertainment 
Concorde Gaming Corporation Players International Incorporated 
Diamondhead Casino Corporation Rio Hotel and Casino Incorporated 
Elsinore Corporation Riviera Holdings Corporation 
Empire Resorts Incorporated Sahara Casino Partners 
Full House Resorts Sands Regent 
Gaming Corporation of America Showboat Incorporated 
Gateway Casinos Income Fund Southwest Casino Corporation 
GB Holdings Incorporated Station Casinos Incorporated 
Global Casinos Incorporated Stratosphere Corporation 
Great Canadian Gaming Corporation Thunderbird Resorts 
Griffin Gaming and Entertainment Trump Entertainment Resorts 
Harrah’s Entertainment Wynn Resorts 
Harvey’s Casino Resorts  
 
Table 2. 
Descriptive statistics for complete sample. 
 
Variable(1) 
N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
LTDR 492 0.31 0.33 -1.48 1.62 
Depreciation 567 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.17 
EOO 567 0.55 0.30 0.01 0.99 
PPE 567 0.63 0.22 0.00 0.97 
SIZE 567 5.52 2.03 0.62 10.34 
MVA/BVA 567 1.59 1.09 0.23 10.85 
Earnings/Price 562 -0.31 2.32 -36.13 5.00 
MVE/BE 568 -0.15 59.45 -1410.10 43.13 
Cap. Exp. / Sales 684 2.47 39.00 0 931.91 
Cap. Exp. /Assets 699 0.09 0.09 0 0.56 
 
(1)LTDR is the ratio of long-term debt (debt maturing in more than three 
years) to total assets.  Depreciation is the ratio of annual depreciation 
expense to total assets.  EOO is Ohlson’s Estimated O Score, a proxy for 
firm risk that measures the probability of bankruptcy.    PPE is the ratio of 
property, plant and equipment (net) to total assets.  Firm size is the natural 
log of total assets. MVA/BVA is a growth opportunity variable, measuring 
the market value of assets to the book value of assets.  Earnings/Price is 
a growth opportunity variable, measured by net income per share divided 
by annual closing stock price.  MVE/BE is a growth opportunity variable, 
measured by the ratio of the market value of equity to book value of 
equity.  Cap. Exp/Sales and Cap. Exp./Assets are both growth opportunity 
variables, utilizing the ratios of annual capital expenditures to total sales 
and total assets, respectively. 
Table 3. 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results for the Entire Sample 
 
Sample 
size 
 
Intercept 
 
DEP 
 
EOO 
 
PPE 
 
SIZE LAGDR MVA 
BVA 
 
E/P MVE 
BVE 
CAP 
EXP 
SALES 
CAP 
EXP 
ASSETS 
 
R2 
(%) 
448 -0.379 
(-5.21)*** 
-0.053 
(-0.08) 
0.333 
(6.50)**
* 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.074 
(9.31)*** 
0.201 
(4.55)*** 
0.019 
(1.49) 
    34.6 
443 -0.335 
(-5.39)*** 
-0.707 
(-1.17) 
0.370 
(7.49)**
* 
0.010 
(0.15) 
0.072 
(9.59)*** 
0.215 
(5.06)*** 
 0.042 
(6.23)*** 
   39.2 
449 -0.309 
(-4.85)*** 
-0.598 
(-0.95) 
0.329 
(6.52)**
* 
0.018 
(0.27) 
0.070 
(9.19)*** 
0.207 
(4.74)*** 
  -0.004 
(-1.58) 
  34.9 
511 -0.256 
(-3.24)*** 
-0.383 
(-0.49) 
0.336 
(6.00)**
* 
-0.078 
(-0.95) 
0.071 
(7.43)*** 
0.223 
(5.25)*** 
   -0.00 
(-0.54) 
 25.4 
524 -0.314 
(-4.43)*** 
0.348 
(0.48) 
0.306 
(5.69)**
* 
-0.074 
(-0.96) 
0.066 
(7.46)*** 
0.252 
(6.11)*** 
    0.534 
(3.53)*** 
28.9 
***Significant at 1 percent.  **Significant at 5 percent.  * Significant at 10 percent. 
LTDR is the ratio of long-term debt (debt maturing in more than three years) to total assets.  Depreciation is the ratio 
of annual depreciation expense to total assets.  EOO is Ohlson’s Estimated O Score, a proxy for firm risk that 
measures the probability of bankruptcy.  PPE is the ratio of property, plant and equipment (net) to total assets.  SIZE 
is the natural log of total assets.  LAGDR is the long-term debt ratio, lagged one period.  MVA/BVA is a growth 
opportunity variable, measuring the market value of assets to the book value of assets.  E/P is a growth opportunity 
variable, measured by net income per share divided by annual closing stock price.  MVE/BVE is a growth opportunity 
variable, measured by the ratio of the market value of equity to book value of equity.  CAP EXP/SALES and CAP 
EXP/ASSETS are both growth opportunity variables, utilizing the ratios of annual capital expenditures to total sales 
and total assets, respectively. 
Table 4. 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results for Casinos (NAICS Code 713210) 
Sample 
size 
 
Intercept 
 
DEP 
 
EOO 
 
PPE 
 
SIZE LAGDR MVA 
BVA 
 
E/P MVE 
BVE 
CAP EXP 
SALES 
CAP EXP 
ASSETS 
 
R2 
(%) 
169 -0.541 
(-4.83)*** 
1.204 
(1.13) 
0.366 
(4.06)*** 
0.032 
(0.27) 
0.088 
(5.93)*** 
0.198 
(2.49)** 
0.037 
(1.60) 
    39.9 
165 -0.425 
(-4.20)*** 
0.451 
(0.44) 
0.371 
(4.19)*** 
0.036 
(0.32) 
0.082 
(5.50)*** 
0.219 
(2.71)*** 
 0.069 
(1.79)* 
   38.9 
173 -0.420 
(-4.33)*** 
0.317 
(0.33) 
0.373 
(4.28)*** 
0.317 
(0.33) 
0.084 
(5.76)*** 
0.211 
(2.71)*** 
  -0.007 
(-
1.62) 
  39.9 
187 -0.415 
(-3.23)** 
0.900 
(0.66) 
0.401 
(3.69)*** 
-0.033 
(-0.22) 
0.086 
(4.69)*** 
0.182 
(2.23)** 
   -0.000 
(-0.34) 
 27.6 
195 -0.429 
(3.67)*** 
1.753 
(1.34) 
0.341 
(3.27)*** 
-0.033 
(-0.23) 
0.076 
(4.19)*** 
0.238 
(3.00)** 
    0.414 
(1.44) 
30.8 
***Significant at 1 percent.  **Significant at 5 percent.  * Significant at 10 percent. 
 
LTDR is the ratio of long-term debt (debt maturing in more than three years) to total assets.  Depreciation is the ratio 
of annual depreciation expense to total assets.  EOO is Ohlson’s Estimated O Score, a proxy for firm risk that 
measures the probability of bankruptcy.  PPE is the ratio of property, plant and equipment (net) to total assets.  SIZE 
is the natural log of total assets.  LAGDR is the long-term debt ratio, lagged one period.  MVA/BVA is a growth 
opportunity variable, measuring the market value of assets to the book value of assets.  E/P is a growth opportunity 
variable, measured by net income per share divided by annual closing stock price.  MVE/BVE is a growth opportunity 
variable, measured by the ratio of the market value of equity to book value of equity.  CAP EXP/SALES and CAP 
EXP/ASSETS are both growth opportunity variables, utilizing the ratios of annual capital expenditures to total sales 
and total assets, respectively. 
Table 5. 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results for Casino Hotels (NAICS Code 721120) 
 
Sample 
size 
 
Intercept 
 
DEP 
 
EOO 
 
PPE 
 
SIZE LAGDR MVA 
BVA 
 
E/P MVE 
BVE 
CAP EXP 
SALES 
CAP EXP 
ASSETS 
 
R2 
(%) 
272 -0.133 
(-1.05) 
-2.27 
(-2.46)** 
0.284 
(4.67)*** 
-0.037 
-0.32) 
0.064 
(6.77)*** 
0.156 
(2.96)*** 
-0.003 
(-0.21) 
    33.4 
271 -0.176 
(-1.63) 
-2.282 
(-2.84)** 
0.368 
(6.32)*** 
-0.056 
(-0.52) 
0.066 
(7.67)*** 
0.178 
(3.63)*** 
 0.039 
(6.49)*** 
   42.0 
269 -0.136 
(-1.16) 
-2.308 
(-2.57)** 
0.287 
(4.70)*** 
-0.036 
(-0.31) 
0.064 
(7.00)*** 
0.156 
(2.98)*** 
  -0.001 
(-0.14) 
  33.8 
317 -0.086 
(-0.67) 
-2.418 
(-2.38)** 
0.258 
(4.20)*** 
-0.034 
(-0.29) 
0.058 
(5.22)*** 
0.207 
(4.31)*** 
   -0.00 
(-0.11) 
 26.6 
322 -0.154 
(-1.36) 
-1.581 
(-1.80)* 
(0.253 
(4.30)*** 
-0.080 
(-0.72) 
0.059 
(6.24)*** 
0.214 
(4.64)*** 
    0.520 
(3.13)*** 
30.4 
***Significant at 1 percent.  **Significant at 5 percent.  * Significant at 10 percent. 
LTDR is the ratio of long-term debt (debt maturing in more than three years) to total assets.  Depreciation is the ratio 
of annual depreciation expense to total assets.  EOO is Ohlson’s Estimated O Score, a proxy for firm risk that 
measures the probability of bankruptcy.  PPE is the ratio of property, plant and equipment (net) to total assets.  SIZE 
is the natural log of total assets.  LAGDR is the long-term debt ratio, lagged one period.  MVA/BVA is a growth 
opportunity variable, measuring the market value of assets to the book value of assets.  E/P is a growth opportunity 
variable, measured by net income per share divided by annual closing stock price.  MVE/BVE is a growth opportunity 
variable, measured by the ratio of the market value of equity to book value of equity.  CAP EXP/SALES and CAP 
EXP/ASSETS are both growth opportunity variables, utilizing the ratios of annual capital expenditures to total sales 
and total assets, respectively. 
 
